U.S. Foreign Policy: Soviet Union (1977 - 1981) (History)
Proxies, Castro, AIPAC, and the end of Detente
Former U. S. President Jimmy Carter and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev during the SALT II Treaty in Vienna. 6/18/1979 (Getty)
By 1976, the status of the U.S.–Soviet relations came to an unexpected turning point. At one end of the Cold War was the once spry Leonid Llyich Brezhnev now into his tenth year as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. At the other end was the soon-to-be President-Elect James Earl Carter Jr. who at this stage in his career was a political outsider who was not considered a real threat, but who was assuredly vocal about human rights, domestic policies, and U.S. relations with various communist countries.
As a reflection on the period after Carter’s swearing in, author Jonathan Alter recounts that “the President’s new foreign policy would be selective and incomplete, especially as applied to strategically important allies.” Brezhnev’s own overarching goal regarding foreign affairs was to avoid another Great Patriotic War (World War II).
Two years into Carter’s term both men finally met face to face in Vienna.
Introduction
What makes the Carter years (1977 –1981) interesting is the initial lack of an actual foreign policy. Most actions on behalf of the United States can be viewed as reactionary. Additionally the build up of détente and mutual trust developed throughout the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, began to fracture and collapse early in Carter’s term.
Paired with the decisively interesting move away from Kissinger-helmed policies in the direction of his scholarly opponent Zbigniew “Zbig” Kazimierz Brzezinski, who served as Carter’s National Security Advisor. As U.S. Secretary of State and a former lawyer, Cyrus Roberts Vance filling the role as the moral compass of the Carter administration, and he was oftentimes a rival of Zbig. Because of poor health, addiction, and domestic issues, Brezhnev was not well-versed in foreign policy. By 1976, decisions on the Soviet Union’s behalf were made by a Troika composed of Foreign Minister Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko, Minister of Defense Dmitry Fyodorovich Ustinov, and KGB chief Yuri Andropov.
Throughout this analysis, I will draw upon the work of The Carter–Brezhnev Project. Since its conclusion in 2017, new documents have been made public that provide a clearer snapshot of the mindset behind Carter’s foreign policy. On the Soviet Union’s side, new information about Brezhnev and the decisions made by his Politburo and the Troika were also made available. Together they let us switch back and forth into the insights behind the why’s and how’s of the respective U.S. and Soviet foreign policies.
I will not rely heavily on well-reviewed topics such as SALT II, Eastern Europe, and most of The Americas. Instead, I will examine less-reviewed proxies and disputes that involved Cuba, Portuguese Africa, the Somali Peninsula, and Israel/Palestine.
N.S.A. Director Zbigniew Brzezinski and U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance during the Carter Administration. Date Unknown. CREDIT: Unknown
A Wet Rag in the Face (United States)
Most of the Carter–Brezhnev Project consists of oral histories recorded in the 1990s after the Cold War and derived from a reexamination of the initial face-to-face meeting between both administrations in March of 1977. Contributors included Vance, Zbig, and other members of Carter’s team. Most importantly, representatives from the Russian delegation also made contributions. These contributors included Anatolia F. Dobrynin, former Soviet ambassador to the United States; Nikolai Detinov, former Soviet first deputy defense minister; Sergei Tarasenko, former U.S. specialist in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Viktor Sukhodrev, former interpreter and aide to Leonid Brezhnev and Andrei Gromyko.
At the outset, Vance stated the primary goal was to “examine errors made by one or both sides in the process that led to the collapse of relations between Moscow and Washington.”
The mood prior to the first interactions is reflected in this comment made in January 1977 by Victor Zorza, a reporter from The Washington Post after hearing then President Carter’s speech on the de-escalation of nuclear weapons a few days prior: “We are approaching one of those rare moments in history when a lucky combination of circumstances on both sides opens the way to a breakthrough in international relations.”
The opening negotiations were about SALT II. Vance’s first of two opening proposals was to assist in the deliverance of Carter’s inaugural promise of a deep reduction in the nuclear arsenals of both nations. His second proposal was an extension of the strategic arms limitation of the Vladivostok Accords that were signed under Former President Gerald Ford and Brezhnev in 1974, but were due to expire in 1977.
Negotiations went poorly after their initial interactions as the Soviet delegation stated that the cuts were offensive. They outright rejected the second proposal. Vance responded to what was described as an uncharacteristically emotional and vindictive response by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko during a press conference by stating that it was like getting a “cold, wet rag across the face.” In the press, détente was categorized as dead. The overall consensus was doubt on each side regarding the seriousness of their intentions.
“When he [Carter] assumed office, he seriously contemplated the possibility of using that initial phase of innovation which comes with a new administration to achieve a more comprehensive arms control regime with the Soviet Union. And that is what drove him in that direction…He stressed very strongly that the purpose of any such initiative would not be to gain any advantage for the United States,” Zbigniew Brezinski, 1994.
In their individual reflections, a lack of empathy and not viewing the circumstances from the other’s perspective appear to be the mutual culprits behind the disintegration of the talks. The “three critical mistakes in foreign policymaking” were as follows:
1. Not seeing the opponent’s longing for peace.
2. Not seeing the opponent’s fear of being attacked.
3. Not seeing the opponent’s understandable anger.
With tensions ramped up to a considerable height, moving forward on any topic became more difficult. This came to cloud any and all issues concerning both nations. In hindsight, Zbig has stated that mistakes were made on the U.S. side due to the foibles made during initial interactions.
From the U.S. perspective, the legacy of Kissinger and the CIA was still omnipresent, so back channels, secret deals, and coups, which were all serious commitments, were taken off the table. Henceforth, everything was going to be done above board through the Secretary of State. The Soviet’s stance, as explained by Vladislav Zubok, was how the Soviets were viewed by the Carter administration and every incoming administration as being a “mixture of apprehension, suspension, and hope,” which were either ramped up or quashed during initial interactions.
Dobrynin clarified that the “deep cuts” were already a factor prior to the first meeting since the Soviets learned about them from Carter’s speech. At this stage, the Soviets were curious as to how deep Carter was expecting them to cut. The real concern was how to take Carter’s new direction in relations with the Soviet Union. Dobrynin states, “I don’t say it was a good course or a bad course, but a change of course. It was a change in arms negotiations, the proposal of drastic reductions. It was the new position of human rights. It looked as though at the very beginning of the new administration you were setting a new agenda, an agenda proposed by you—a completely new one, which we didn’t have before. How were we to deal with this?”
Interpreter Sukhodrev, recounts that emotions got the better of both sides as they began to pepper conversations ranging from SALT II to other topics including Cuba and Africa. Once more, the new administration was viewed as “topping the whole structure” that previous administrations had built. On top of this was the Soviet Union’s views toward human rights that Gromyko seemingly detested and wanted to go back to the previous stance under Kissinger, which was to treat it as “of no practical importance.” Leslie Gelb, who served as Assistant Secretary of State under the Carter Administration, also recounts that the human rights issue “was driving you Soviets crazy.” A fact that was not a secret.
Unfortunately, all of these events set the mood for Carter’s term. This was evident by an interaction between Brezhnev at the Vienna Summit in 1979. He proceeds to point across the table at Vance and says, “Here is the man responsible for the collapse of détente.”
Although the SALT II agreement was signed in 1979, there was hope that it would lead to an overall improvement in relations. Upon reflection at the 1994 oral history roundtable, the seemly mutual consensus is that more transparency on the U.S. side would not have solved anything. From their perspective, the freely expressive nature of their press junkets revealed their intentions in the public sphere that was then repeated in negotiations. If the Soviets already knew the U.S. delegates’ intentions, why act so spurned by them?
The widely theorized conclusion is that Carter and Brezhnev were not curious enough about the other’s intentions. They were also not interested in listening to their more seasoned advisors or extending empathy. They each powered forward with their separate agendas that created a deeper rift between both nations.
President Carter and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Brezhnev meet in Vienna for SALT II Signing. 6/1979 CREDIT AP Archive
Geopolitics Under Advanced Socialism (Soviet Union)
A snapshot of the USSR’s dealings with the Carter Administration serves as a good primer on the major issues affecting the nation and how they influenced foreign policy. This is important in consideration of the various actions and threats to their proxies throughout the world. An ideal starting point is an excerpt from the third edition of A History of Russia, which was written and published by Professor Nicholas V. Riasanovsky in 1977.
“The very closely related but even larger issue of détente between the Soviet Union and the United States also seemed to have an uncertain future at the time of the Twenty-fifth Party Congress and the developing American presidential campaign. With an explicit ‘cold war’ a thing of the past, détente scored a resounding success at the Helsinki Conference in the summer of 1975, where the United States and other Western countries accepted in effect the communist redrawing of the map of central and eastern Europe following the Second World War in exchange for unsubstantiated promises of greater contacts between the two worlds and greater degree of freedom in those contacts.”
Riasanovsky continues by referring explicitly to the foreign nations tied into the Soviets’ sphere of influence:
“A comprehensive economic agreement between the U.S.S.R and the U.S.A. failed over the questions of the most favored nation clause, credits, and the American concern with the fate of Soviet Jews. Furthermore as 1976 succeeded 1975 the policy of détente was increasingly challenged in the West both because of Soviet activities in Portugal, Angola, and elsewhere and because of the one-sidedness of economic and other provisions associated with it.”
Within the Soviet nation, economic systems were failing to produce the results needed to keep the country viable. Collective farms that employed most of the nation’s citizens became façades that supported the Illusion that socialism was working. With the population unable to express their concerns, it became a closely guarded secret until the 1980s. According to The Russian Reader:
“The question of how much the Soviet economy could tolerate a partial market system became ever more pressing during the Brezhnev years as the system of collective farms faltered and scarcity, deficits, and rationing became the order of the day in many regions.”
The model that once worked under Stalin could not be sustained under a mixed economy, especially one giving aid to other nations. A malaise developed and workers only did enough to achieve their tasks. This extended to the scientific, medical, and related fields where advances were also stunted and forced creative dullness. The need for Brezhnev to try and make détente work became more desperate.
Riasanosky writes that “Brezhnev’s determined pursuit of détente with the United States and the West as a whole may well be inspired even more by the general Soviet need of a broad access to the science and technology of the West and to a freer and more creative spirit than by any particular economic desiderata.” To make this palpable to the party, a new advanced form of socialism that incorporated the needed adjustments was revealed and immediately displeased the members of the Politburo.
At this point, Brezhnev was developing a cult of personality similar to Stalin. But by the mid-1970s, his health and subsequent drug addiction were serious issues that attracted negative attention and mockery. He was no longer a spry young man in solid physical shape. The toll of his perceived and possible failures drove him to drink, smoke profusely, and take a cocktail of painkillers and hallucinogens. His numerous health issues, that the West was not fully aware of but had their suspicions, crept into his conduct and affected his duties, resulting in last-minute cancellations, changes to schedules, and cryptic behaviors.
“Brezhnev’s addiction was also the reason signing the Helsinki Final Act establishing the CSCE on 1 August 1975 was not a triumph leading to greater détente, but the dawn of a new era of mistrust,” Susanne Schattenberg, Brezhnev: The Making of a Stateman (2021, I.B. Taurus).
Attempts were made to get Brezhnev to take better care of himself and remove from his circle those individuals who supported his self-abuse. Only some of these attempts were successful. By the time of Carter’s presidential campaign in 1976, the promise of human rights, end of back channels, and refusal to accept Kissinger’s assistance raised concerns among the Soviets. Carter demanded that Brezhnev follow through on his promises made at Helsinki about human rights. Brezhnev, whose personal style at political gatherings was to finesse others, eventually threw Carter’s rhetoric back at him during their face-to-face meetings in Vienna (1979). He reminded Carter that the U.S.’s issues of race, unemployment, and women’s rights did not factor into their negotiations and that the U.S. president should keep foreign policy free of ideology.
Cyrus Vance addressed these issues in his book, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy. He states that there was a lot of confusion about what human rights meant to different groups. There were also two distinct camps developing that either saw the issue as a political weapon against the Soviet Union or being applied universally. According to Vance, “I wanted to make clear the shape and substance of our human rights policy, and the fact that it was universal in application, yet flexible enough to be adapted to individual situations.”
Back to the events in Vienna, Brezhnev was frustrated and tired of American propaganda, and he began to turn down invitations to special events, such as the opera, and effectively tuned out as issues such as Angola began to emerge. I will go into more details later, after discussing Castro’s Cuba.
Brezhnev being coached before delivering a televised speech. 1979 CREDIT: Unknown
Invisible Ideological Ties (Cuban–Soviet Relations)
During the Carter Administration, U.S.–Cuban–Soviet relations were ramped up almost to a breaking point. Much of the pressure stemmed from agreements made between the USSR and the U.S. directly after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Other pressure came from Fidel Castro’s belief about what a socialist nation should be and the right to self-determination for Latin and Caribbean countries within the closest orbit of the United States.
The most immediate concern of the Brezhnev Doctrine (1968) was, and continued to be, support for Eastern and Central Europe. Because Cuba was a foothold into North America, it received strategic and economic support from the Soviets. Gromyko used Cuba as an example of how the “Soviet Commonwealth” was not confined by geography but by “invisible ideological ties.” Military matters were tricky as discussed in the next section.
A decade prior to the Carter Administration, it is hard not to get the impression that Castro was often viewed as a petulant child—a perception that comes from how he was often addressed by Soviet officials, but most importantly, how he was not consulted during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
By the late 1960s the Soviet Union found difficulties in understanding Cuba’s decision-making on all governmental issues. As stated in the book, Our Comrades In Havana, by Radoslav Yordanov, “Havana’s improvisational economic management and the worsening terms of its trade with the Soviet bloc compelled the socialist states to step up their engagement with Cuba to preserve the Castro regime, their investment in the country, and prospects of waving the socialist flag in the United States’s underbelly.” By 1972, Castro’s visit to Moscow and Eastern Europe changed this dynamic and brought both nations together in what I also interpret as a show of humility on Castro’s part to invite the Soviets into his decision-making process.
“All of us, dear friend Fidel Castro, know very well how to assess the extraordinary importance which the victory of the revolution in Cuba has for international progress, and especially for the success of the anti-imperialist liberation struggle by the other people of Latin America. Therefore, we follow with great interest and in close solidarity the efforts of the Cuban Communist Party and people to create a new socialist order.” Toast made by Erich Honecker, First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) Central Committee on June 13, 1972, during Castro’s visit to East Berlin.
In August, Cuba became a member of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) trading group with Russia, which was a decision with which other countries within the bloc strongly disagreed. Consequently, improvements in the implementation of building up socialism led to what is considered the peak of Cuban–Soviet relations. Cuba’s military and economic reliance on the Soviet Union increased in a one-way direction. Castro, who was influenced by Eastern European leaders, moved away from his previous direction of armed struggle being the only method to achieve autonomy. He replaced his former doctrine with Lenin’s theories regarding the Great October Socialist Revolution and seeking peaceful coexistence as a revolutionary path. We can mark this period as Castro’s self-remaking into a foreign dignitary. He soon got involved in affairs throughout African and Latin American countries and slowly provided military aid to their own efforts to be independent.
Cuba began working with the Soviet Union on various campaigns throughout Portuguese Africa and Lisboa. The Soviets looked at this cooperation as an opportunity to spread socialism into Africa. Not wasting this opportunity, the Soviets joined the Cubans in providing military support.
Congress in Moscow with Brezhnev, Honecker and Castro, 1976 CREDIT: RBB Media
Soviet Brigade in Cuba Affair
By the late 1970s, Cuba was heavily dependent on the USSR. In an assessment by the Soviets, the Cuban economy was more a distribution system than an actually functioning economy. Other members of the Eastern European bloc felt the strain of supporting a country that gave them nothing in return. The Cuban perspective was that unlearned idealism and insufficient rigor were to blame for their stagnation. Frustrated by a lack of progress, it was suggested to then Defense Minister Raul Castro and Carlos Rafael, Minister and President of the National Commission of Economic and Scientific Technical Collaboration, to improve relations with the United States. This was an obvious bid to end or at decrease economic sanctions.
The first memo under the Carter Administration relating to only Cuba is dated February 24, 1977. It is heavily redacted with the subject line, Information Items from Zbig. What is available for us to see is the following:
“Cuba Wants Early Negotiations with the U.S.: [the following is redacted] State notes...comments made recently by a Cuban radio commentator known frequently to air Castro’s views who said that Cuba and the U.S. would hold talks soon and “March will be the month of great events for the two nations.”
Dated April 6, 1977, with the main subject being Brezhnev’s speech at Castro’s dinner, we see plainly how Cuba is used as an intermediate regarding USSR–U.S. relations. Zbig notes this brief mention during Brezhnev’s speech recounting the following:
• Recent contacts and talks showed that, instead of moving forward on arms control, “our partners are losing their constructive approach and keeping so far to a one-sided position.
• But a “reasonable accommodation is possible,” provided the U.S. side “realizes its responsibility” and searches for a mutually acceptable solution “not in words but by deeds.”
The summer and fall of 1979 became what Zbig referred to as the worst time in Soviet–Cuban–U.S. relations after the National Security Agency (NSA) discovered a Soviet military unit in Cuba. Fearing that the news would destroy the SALT II talks, the CIA under Stansfield Turner was sent to gather more intelligence. What they learned was determined to be a breach of the USSR–U.S. agreement made after the 1962 Missile Crisis. Up to 3,000 soldiers were conducting military drills on Cuba’s San Pedro Beach. This, combined with the uncovering of Cuban backing of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, soured Cuban–U.S. relations. Cyrus Vance recalled new intelligence: “In the fall of 1978, we became aware of the possible presence in Cuba of Soviet Mig-23 aircraft. Our intelligence community believed a version of this aircraft might be carrying nuclear weapons. By mid-November, there was growing evidence that there were as many as a dozen Mig-23s with the Cuban forces, although we could not be certain whether or how many nuclear-capable models were present.”
What was left out of this narrative is that the Russians had been on the island for some time conducting combat drills, and they had no plans for any attacks on the U.S. Now instead of a de-escalation, Vance became the rallying voice to approach the Soviets about the matter. Using heated language and insinuating an invasion, political pressure was mounting to discontinue SALT II talks:
“To save face, Carter needed the Soviets to do something. Short of withdrawing the nonexistent combat brigade, they could announce that they would ‘disaggregate it,’ Brzezinski suggested. Or they could say that it was there for training purposes, which had been true for at least seventeen years.”
Choosing to stand up to Brezhnev, Carter reached out with ultimatums. Brezhnev’s response was to tell him to drop it. The non-issue became an issue that over months somewhat faded into the background as more of an affair that everyone would rather forget but too embarrassed to let go of. Brezhnev was now egging the U.S. along using the situation to increase arms sales that the U.S. allies also found useful for their own bids for weapons sales.
In a clear attempt to use the occasion for more strategic and military assistance is a memo dated October 9, 1979 written by Zbig with the subject line of Daily Report: A letter from Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat on his opinion regarding the matter.
“In a response to your letter on the Soviet brigade in Cuba, President Sadat voiced his concern that ‘this Soviet move…cannot be seen in isolation; rather, as a grand design aimed at destabilizing various areas of the Middle East, Africa, Far East, and Latin America.’ Sadat continued that the response should not be confined to one area or method, but needs to be global and comprehensive. More specifically, he suggested a long-range program of military and economic assistance to countries directly affected by Soviet efforts, increasing capabilities of those countries though training of personnel and supplying weapons, and supporting genuine liberation movements.”
In an interview in 2004, former President Carter recounted what his foreign policy for Cuba was meant to be. “So, Cuba was one of a list of things. It wasn’t at the top of my agenda, but I felt it was time for us to have completely normal relations with Cuba. I felt then, as I do now, that the best way to bring about a change in its Communist regime was to have open trade and commerce, visitations, and diplomatic relations with Cuba.”
“I immediately eliminated any restraints on travel, which I could do unilaterally, and I opened up indirect communications with Castro to let him know through normal means my offer to move toward full diplomatic relations.”
Reaching the point where political prisoners were released and both camps found common ground, the issue of Cuba’s involvement in Africa was the red line that slowly deteriorated relations. “I [Carter] felt that Cuba, which claimed to be a non-aligned entity, was playing an unwarranted role in promoting elements in, and training elements in, Angola that were working against an overall peace agreement.” Carter recounts, “Angola was not the turning point. The turning point for me, if I remember clearly, was in Ethiopia.”
Jimmy Carter 2006 Interview on Cuba. Excerpt from 638 Ways to Kill Castro. CREDIT: Channel 4
More Sentimental Than Rational (Portuguese Africa)
Events in Portuguese Africa and the Somali Peninsula from 1974 throughout Carter’s Administration highlight an interesting but seldom reviewed piece of the Cold War. Initially African foreign policy consisted of finding a resolution to conflicts in Namibia, Rhodesia, and ending apartheid in South Africa.
Instead, each world power attempted to use circumstances on the ground as either an attempt to further their own interests or stay out of each other’s way, but ultimately all were made into pawns. What makes this period significantly interesting is that each side was seldom in control. They were often used against each other by regional actors who turned relations on their heads. In the end, both sides pivoted their own plans in an attempt to keep changes to a minimum.
Another dynamic of this interplay is the involvement of Castro’s Cuba, which gave itself the continuous mission of aiding unaligned nations to reach self-determination through guerilla warfare. The added wrinkle to all of this is the involvement of China and their sour relations with the Soviet Union. Before I dissect the events in Ethiopia that caused Carter to break off relations with Cuba, I want to work chronologically beginning with the end of the “Estado Novo” (New State) on April 24, 1974, that brought about the end of Portuguese colonialism.
“The Carnation Revolution offered an opportunity for rapid decolonization, which was a priority for the MFA (Armed Forces Movement). In May, the leader of Portuguese Socialists, Mario Soares, was appointed foreign minister and immediately entered talks with the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) in Guinea-Bissau and to FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação Moçambique) in Mozambique. In Angola, however, the transition was much more complicated because the liberation movement was split between three nationalist organizations—FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA—with each relying on regional allies and international donors for support,” Natalia Telepneva: Cold War Liberation.
Although I make minor references to the former Portuguese colonies as a whole, the primary focus will be on Angola whose three political groups serve as local proxies: The National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) has received aid and support from the United States through the CIA’s USAID since the Kennedy Administration. The People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has received support from the Soviet Union and military support from Cuba. Finally, the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) received aid via a coalition between China and the United States.
In 1977, the hot potato was Angola and the human rights policy of Carter. As former Secretary of State Vance states in the mid-1980s: “As had been true during the Nixon and Ford administrations, our ability and determination to pursue a balanced policy toward the Soviet Union was most severely tested in the Third World.”
Vance goes on to describe the first real test for the administration in Angola: “In March of 1977, a force of Katangan opponents of President Mobutu Seko of Zaire launched an incursion from Angola into the Shaba province (formerly Katanga) of Zaire. The regime of Angola President Agotinho Neto (backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba), with whom we had no diplomatic relations, apparently permitted this attack in retaliation for Mobutu’s covert support of anti-government groups in Angola.”
At this stage, the U.S. interest in Zaire was solely economic and military aid, but the major concern was Soviet and Cuba meddling that could cause a conflict. Although Vance mitigated the issue by reframing it as an African issue and bringing in assistance from Nigeria’s President General Olusegun Obasanjo and Foreign Minister Joseph Garba. The major issue became Angola who by this point had a strained relationship with the United States.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had a stronger relation with African nations that began under Khrushchev in the 1950s. The immediate result was the creation of an Africa section of the KGB’s First Directorate in the early 1960s. The head of the department, Vadim Kirpichenko, described his initial goal as an opportunity for spy craft. His second goal was “to contribute to decolonization, support national liberation movements, obtain friends and allies and analyze American policy.” Decolonization became the major goal throughout their relationship leading into the late 1970s. This relationship began to change as Marxism became popular among African nationalists.
Viewed as a push back against colonialism and capitalism, these interests brought the Soviet Union deeper into their orbit that offered a pathway to their goals with the added benefit of funding, support, and most importantly, weapons and the training of their own militaries. As their role expanded, so did the involvement of Cuba as political scientist Jiri Valenta noted: “Cuba’s involvement in Africa was about not only socialism but also political and economic development.” He continues, “In its relations with Cuba, Moscow was almost uniformly assumed to exercise great influence on Havana’s foreign policy, in general, and its Third World involvement, in particular, with Cuba retaining “only a small degree of relative autonomy.”
Many started to quickly see that U.S. foreign policy within the African continent had become nothing more than containment and support of regional allies. You see examples of such in another border dust up toward the end of 1977 between Angola-Zaire with support by Morocco and nuclear weapons testing in South Africa. This new strategy was born out of distrust of the intentions of the United States and pushback against what the administration viewed as the Soviet Union and Cuba taking advantage of racial conflicts.
According to Cyrus Vance, “Black Africa suspected that the United States, which had supported the losers in the Angolan civil war, wanted to protect American and Western strategic interests through a strong Republic of South Africa shielded by a barrier of Black client states dependent upon Pretoria’s political, economic, and military support.”
The Soviet Union was pulled deeper into regional affairs sometimes due to Cuba. It preferred that the regional issues between African states be solved among themselves. I see no valid proof that they took advantage of conflicts. Instead, I see themselves fully committing to an expansion of support to Angola. From 1976 to 1988, the Soviet Union gave Angola’s MPLA 3.4 billion rubles worth of weapons and 1,000 Soviet advisors on hand to train their military.
It was this support that put Neto into the presidency. This tactic is explained in a top-secret sensitive memo from Zbig dated April 6, 1979, and titled: Soviet African Aid Policy.
“Moscow has focused on military assistance programs and not economic aid to compete with the West for influence in the third world. According to the CIA, Nigeria has been particularly critical of this policy, and some Soviet scholars are urging Moscow to alter its approach to development assistance to preserve its short-term payoffs from military aid.”
Both policies found themselves tested on July 13, 1977, with the commencement of the Ogaden War (Ethio–Somalia).
Angolan Civil War | Frontline Footage of Cold War Conflict (1976)
A Russian Weapon Directed at the U.S. (Horn of Africa)
In 1976, then presidential candidate Ronald Reagan stated, “The African problem is a Russian weapon directed at us.” Whereas this president viewed the African continent as a battlefield with only two real sides. Carter viewed it as an ideological battle. By 1976, events that involved the issues of borders and water rights had already unfolded in the Horn leading to war just one year later. A great overview is found in Edward Luce’s book, Zbig:
“In early 1978, the administration’s chief fault line ran through the Horn of Africa, which threatened to host the world’s next big proxy war. In late 1977, Somalia’s President, Mohammed Said Barre, had expelled Soviet advisors after war broke out with neighboring Ethiopia. Confusingly, both were Marxist client regimes.”
Zbig continues with a clear explanation of the main players behind the conflicts and their roles:
“Ethiopia’s revolutionary leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam, had in 1974 overthrown Emperor Haile Selassie. The Soviets responded to Ethiopia’s request for military support after Somali forces occupied Ethiopia’s sand- swept Ogaden region (which has a majority of ethnic Somalis) in mid-1977. Much as in Angola, to which Fidel Castro’s Cuba had sent thirty-six thousand soldiers and civilian personnel to support its Communist insurgency, Moscow was letting Cubans take the lead in Ethiopia. But the Soviet presence was escalating. Somalia had swapped the U.S.S.R’s patronage for America’s; Moscow was now doubling down on Ethiopia.”
There is an irony to the Ogaden War (1977–1978) that was not realized until after the war had begun. That irony being that if both sides had not been supplying large amounts of arms to various regional actors, then the wars as well as various proxy conflicts, would not have escalated into the region’s destabilizing events.
“The demise of détente in the closing years of the 1970s brought the nuclear arms race between Washington and Moscow to a dangerous level. Accordingly, largely as a reaction to the Kremlin’s strategic modernization program, the White House launched a substantial military buildup that sought to restore the balance of power and hamper the Soviet Union’s international ambitions,” according to Radoslav Yordanov: The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa During the Cold War.
The internal memos from within Carter’s team show an interesting timeline of events. From these notes, we see a course correction in strategy after the August 1977 attempt by the Soviets to get the Somalis to withdraw from Ogaden. By September 1997, the Carter Administration stated that it will no longer make weapons available to Somalia or allow Saudi Arabia and Iran to pass on U.S. weapons. In response, the Soviets slowed assistance to Somalia in consideration of their ally Ethiopia.
Alarmed by what was happening on the ground, Sudanese President Gaafar Muhmaad al-Nimeiry reached out to Carter in a personal message stating “We are truly alarmed at the extent of Soviet influence in our region….We expect and hope that the United States in the prevailing circumstances in Africa would response favorably to requests of help from those countries ready and eager to defend themselves against the Soviet threat.” In 1978, the Sudan and Egypt receive weapons assistance and aid in return for their non-belligerence towards Israel.
The back-and-forth requests for aid continue throughout the duration of the war to almost a fever pitch. Both sides requested more assistance with veiled threats that they would court the other world power if nothing was given to them.
By early 1978, Gromyko, First Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union, requested that the U.S. join them in a mediation effort and this was promptly dismissed. An interesting memo from Zbig in early 1978 is about the recurring concern about the Soviet presence in Ethiopia and about ways to make the war more costly to Moscow. At that time, President Carter expressed that he hopes to dissuade both the Cubans and Soviets from sending more weapons and soldiers to Ethiopia.
By March 1978, Ethiopia became the bittersweet victor, ending Somalia’s attempt to annex the region. Going into the 1980s, each side’s political parties (Ethiopia’s Derg and Somali’s SRSP) evolved into regimes with horrible human rights records. As synopsized by author Radoslav Yordanov, “The Ogaden War had crucial significance to the regimes in Addis Ababa and Mogadishu. To the Ethiopian leadership, still inexperienced and torn by internal political strife, the victory over Somalia provided a chance for the consolidation of Mengistu’s place at the top. To Siad Barre, though, it triggered a protractive struggle for survival by intensifying clan-based loyalties, which eventually came to replace national interests.”
Although not expressly said, it is not hard to guess that the war was a breaking point for U.S. – Cuban relations.
Combined with what was still the issue of Soviet troops on the ground in Cuba and Castro’s comments in the press regarding Carter’s trustworthiness. Cuban relations broke down eventually leading to the dissolution of relations between both nations ending an opportunity for Cuba to end the blockade.
Somalian President Siad Barre Warns the USSR Against Involvement in the Ogaden War | Nov. 1977
Toward Peace in the Middle East (Israel and Palestine)
An interesting footnote to U.S.–Soviet relations during the Carter years is Israel and its relations with its neighbors, as the Camp David Accords became the crowning achievement of his term in office. The attempt to find a solution to Middle East peace became a quiet secondary goal.
The big question is how did Carter’s vocal views on human rights mesh with the Israel and Palestine issue? Serving as inspiration for Carter was a controversial 1975 Brookings Institution report that offered solutions for peace in the region. What it suggested was that the U.S. and the Soviets sponsor a joint Arab–Israeli settlement that could lead to self-determination for Palestine.
Author Edward Luce states that Carter received 70% of the Jewish vote but “there was nevertheless disquiet about Carter’s pro-Israeli credentials among Washington’s leading Jewish organizations, particularly at the increasingly powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).” Although Carter supported the Palestinians, he scaled back his support during the election.
Prior to Carter’s swearing in on January 20, 1977, the executive director of AIPAC, Morris Amitay, reached out to Zbig with a list of 100 or so individuals, including William Quandt who had directed the Brookings report or had suspected biases against Israel. Zbig threw the list in the trash.
Here, I will not go into details about the domestic issues concerning Israel and AIPAC since doing so will stray too far from foreign policy concerning the Soviet Union. However, I do want to present what the Brookings report suggested in regard to Palestine as well as what became the major goals of the Carter Administration and how they related to the Soviet Union.
Section 4. Settlement Subsection d. Boundaries. Israel undertakes to withdraw by agreed stages to the June 5, 1967, lines with only such modifications as are mutually accepted. Boundaries will probably need to be safeguarded by demilitarized zones supervised by UN forces.
Subsection E. Palestine. There should be a provision for Palestinian self-determination, subject to Palestinian acceptance of the sovereignty and integrity of Israel within agreed boundaries. This might be in the form either of an independent Palestinian state accepting the obligations and commitments of the peace agreements or of a Palestinian entity voluntarily federated with Jordan but exercising extensive political autonomy.
Section 5. The U.S. role in the heavy lifting of negotiations and bringing all parties together is laid at the feet of the U.S.: “in all of his, the United States should work with the USSR to the degree that Soviet willingness to play a constructive role will permit.”
Martin Indyk. Resolution of Arab-Israeli Conflict Should Include Syria and Palestinians. 2016 CREDIT: Brookings Institution
The Liberal Internationalist (Conclusion)
Overall, Jimmy Carter’s foreign policies were a failure at home and were only marginally successful abroad. With some difficulty, I have to say that a foreign policy based strictly on human rights is heart-warming. However, not having any actual workable goals leaves a big gap. Toward the end of his term, Soviet relations became worse with an official end of détente and the onset of the Afghan–Soviet War at the end of 1979. One of the last memos regarding the U.S.S.R dated January 1981 stated, “Soviet military spending has increased steadily and significantly by an average of 4%–5% a year,” steadily outpacing the growth we see the end of the Soviet Union beginning around this time. Overspending and fruitless endeavors combined with horrible economic policies lead to their ruin.
Johnathan Alter, author of His Very Best: Jimmy Carter, A Life recounts:
“Carter has been second-guessed from both the Left and the Right for his role in the resumption of serious tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Left claimed he overreacted to the invasion of Afghanistan, that vital interests in the Persian Gulf were not truly at stake. The Right insisted that Carter was naïve about the Soviets, that he weakened American defenses, and that Ronald Reagan showed the firmness necessary to win the Cold War.”
Alter also explains that, over time, both sides have been proven wrong. An argument is provided that Carter was a skillful tactician laying down the seeds of the end of the Soviet Union that Reagan would eventually reap the benefits of. Personally, I simply don’t see that conclusion. James Earl Carter Jr. was the Liberal Internationalist whose work did lead to the end of the USSR, but I don’t see it as intentional. As stated in the beginning of this article, his actions appear more reactionary combined with sticking to his own principals rather than part of a grand plan. Although he did show that a different direction could be taken, as far as foreign policy, he did not have the wherewithal or the luck to be successful with taking it.
Carter Press Conference On Human Rights in Russia. 8/2/1977 CREDIT: AP Archive
Suggested Reading:
Keshler, this is a thorough and most appropriate reminder that honorable people of diametrically opposed political identities can come to consensus on the more timely, more universal issues of the times. You picked two fabled, world-class leaders who relationship serves as an excellent example of how humankind ought to make sense of what divides us in 2026.