Racist Lies We Tell Ourselves and Then Tell Others (History)
Are Racial Differences Inevitable?
Anyone can be racist despite their color and ethnic group. A current popular comment is that “racism does not exist among systematically oppressed people.” A similar comment is that “it is not possible for Black people to be racist because they have never been in a position of power.” Both are repeated so often that they’ve become mantras, and both are untrue.
Recent history is fraught with violence between different racial and ethnic groups that are not considered conventionally White. Each example of corrosive nationalism, slavery, war, manipulation, poor government policies, and a lack of understanding can lead to friction between different groups that have a shared history of being oppressed. The United States is not the only country with these issues.
This is not an ode to international racism nor is it a singling out of one group over another to point a finger at and state that they are racist. The following events, that you may or may not know, occurred for different reasons, but they are all race-based wars.
Operation Dudula: Black South Africans/Various Migrants (2008– )
The camera pans to the left and a man in his 60s comes into view. Using arm-braced canes to walk, he is introduced as The Commander (Charles), a resident of the Alexandria Township in Johannesburg who wields considerable clout. As a representative of Operation Dudula, a Zulu word translated as “to push,” “force out,” or “knock down,” he speaks on behalf of the group who in late October 2023 registered as a political party. During his interview with Channel 4 News, he shows the interviewer the “foreign” migrants who are undercutting the prices of South African products, destabilizing the economy, illegally using public services, and taking jobs away from citizens. When asked about the violence toward migrants, he states that Operation Dudula’s role is to “clean our township.”
By raiding spaza shops (informal convenience stores doubling as homes) and blocking services such as healthcare and education via physical intimidation and vigilantism, the enforcers of Operation Dudula have become the face of anti-migrant sentiment in the country. Conflicts have caused transplants who successfully immigrated to the country decades earlier to worry about their future. Many are taking buses out of the region. As for the illegal immigrants, they are being deported in increasing numbers.
Yet the coverage of the violence in the 2008 South African Riots, 2019 Johannesburg Riots, and 2021 riots often between South African nationals, migrants, transplants who have gained citizenship, and various ethnic groups often does not show how South Africa arrived at its current turbulent state.
Instead, you will most likely hear politicians and public servants using anti-migrant sentiment to avoid the underlying and unresolved issues after Apartheid.
The Two Gate System
Prior to the dismantling of Apartheid (1990–1994), South African immigration policy consisted of the “two gate system.” The front gate allowed for the migration of people considered attractive and fitting the ideal image of migrants, typically White Protestant Europeans. The back gate prevented the immigration of people were not considered the right fit, but it allowed in cheap laborers on temporary visas.
In 1961, the South African government created the Department for Immigration, which began importing white migrants so that the country wouldn’t “sink into an ocean of color.” In the 1960s, state aid and subsidies were funneled into European immigration to cover moving, living, and other expenses In 1991, these programs were halted.
Throughout the 1970s–1980s, South Africa avoided the various civil wars across by implementing tight border control and a strict immigration policy. The Mozambique refugee crisis (1977–1992) finally forced the then Frederik Wilhem de Klerk administration (1989–1994) to create a refugee policy. The “new” policy consisted of old acts that classified the Mozambique refugees as illegal immigrants who were often deported.
Yet faced with a migrant crisis that could not be deported away, the de Klerk administration considered the acceptance of refugee status in line with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
The Aliens Control Act (1991), nicknamed “Apartheid’s last act,” consolidated and simplified all immigration acts, becoming the foundation of South Africa’s migration policy until being ruled unconstitutional in 2002 due to its contradiction to the 1996 Post-Apartheid Constitution. Unfortunately, the damage was done.
After Apartheid
Toward the mid-1990s, the migration of Africans increased along with Asians and some Europeans. Filling the void made by White Europeans who left near the end of Apartheid, these new migrant workers got unstable work and “temporary work status.
Unfortunately, the Mandela administration (1994–1999) was ill-suited to deal with the changing migration situation, brain drain, asylum seekers, white-collar workers, and undocumented migrants.
What was expected was a more open policy as the African National Congress (ANC) was a Black government. Instead, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and related circles warned that “the response (to migration) is taking on an increasingly racial and nationalistic tone as some political groups try and whip up xenophobia, presumably to set the ground for a ruthless clampdown. There are good moral reasons to warn against such sentiments. After all, this country, with its previous policy of destabilization, bears a good deal of responsibility for the economic chaos of our neighbors” (Mail & Guardian, September 1994).
By the early 2000s, two new acts (Immigration Act 2002 and 2004) were introduced to reflect the changes in policy. Combined, they allowed for constitutional rights and a dual system of limited permanent high-skilled migrants and temporary low-skilled migrants. Yet regardless of the slight progress made to developing an immigration policy, the role of labor and education lagged far behind.
As the 2000s continued, proper immigration control became a recurring issue for the Department of Home Affairs, but by this point so many migrants were now living and working within the nation that former Director General William Masetlha stated in 2000, “Even in the unlikely event of all further illegal migration into the country being halted and their presence remaining constant at the 8.0 million ballpark figure, the removal of them at the current rate of 180,000 per year would take a total of 44 years .”(Africa Development Forum 2011)
Concurrently, the Zimbabwean Crisis (2000–2008) posed a strain on surrounding nations as refugees fled the nation seeking aid, sanctuary, and employment in whichever country they could access. Forced to create a Zimbabwe policy that involved increased deportations, denying asylum claims fell to local police to catch illegal immigrants. This increased police/governmental corruption and human trafficking in collaboration with the police, but deportations soared to 150,000 a year. The policy only briefly slowed in early 2010 was recanted in early 2011.
Zimbabweans became the scapegoats for crime, violence, and, most importantly, taking jobs, even as South Africa was experiencing economic growth. Things were soon to take a turn for the worse.
The Blame Game
Between the 1990s–2000s, South Africa transitioned into a migration hub attracting not only regional migrants from neighboring South African countries but also nationals from North America, Eastern Europe, Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, and Central, East, and West Africa. Throughout this period, the “South Africa First” policies of nationalism undermined progress, leading to confusion and many sectors of society simply ignoring the growing migration problem.
By May 11, 2008, South Africa was failing in education; struggling with the economy, poverty, crime, indebtedness, high unemployment, HIV/AIDS crisis; and going through socioeconomic changes. On that day in Alexandria, South African nationals who were on the bottom tiers of society began a series of violent xenophobic clashes, looting, and chaos that continued until June 2008.
Throughout the 2010s, politicians ramped up migrants as scapegoats for their own failures and nationals needed someone to blame. According to independent surveys, the “triple challenge” of poverty, inequality, and unemployment showed that South Africa was one of the most unequal countries in the world. By the end of the 2010 decade, almost two-thirds (63.9%) of people ages 15 to 24 and 42.0% of people ages 25 to 34 were out of work.
By 2017, Deputy Police Minister Bongani Mkongi claimed that “80% of inner-city Johannesburg was under migrants’ control . . . failure to address this would result in the country being about 80% dominated by foreign nationals and the future of South Africa could be a foreign national .” (“Deputy Police Minister questions why Hillbrow is 80% occupied by foreign nationals” Eyewitness News, 2017) This type of rhetoric continued to fan flames that once again ignited after the 2019 arrest of former President Jacob Zuma, which brought tensions with Nigeria, combined with the COVID pandemic, and the continued lack of real development leading to the creation of Operation Dudula.
According to Risenga Maluleke, South Africa’s statistician-general, about 3.95 million immigrants are 6.5% of the foreign-born population, with the majority having moved to South Africa as children. Surveys on whether immigrants steal jobs also showed that immigrants bring in 9% of GDP and have a positive impact. Although there are illegals left in limbo or forcibly deported like the UNHCR refugees in mid-2023, the same problems remain.
With an election looming in 2024, the big question is: Regardless of which party dominates the polls (ANC, Dudula, Democratic Alliance), can South Africa fix itself or will it continue to use immigrants and violence as scapegoats for unresolved inequality?
Black March: Ethnic Clashes of Romani and Hungarian Minorities (March 1990)
Note: Prior to reading this section, you may want to review my earlier article that touches on the history of Ethnic Hungarians in Romania leading into the 20th century.
I cannot imagine the thoughts running through the minds of Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife Elena on Christmas Day 1989.
Only 48 hours earlier, President Ceausescu attempted to quell the crowd from the balcony of the Republic’s House in Bucharest. With a prepared speech, he attempted to commend the protests as a “great demonstration” and thanked the various parties involved.
Yet as shots rang out, someone shouted, “they have entered the building.” A brief intermission ensues then the camera re-focuses on Ceausescu trying to calm the crowd.
Cut back to that Christmas morning. He was facing a firing squad from his own military. At least 125 bullets ended the 25-year dictatorship.
National Identity
Transylvania, which has the majority of Hungarian ethnic people in Western Romania, was a part of Hungary until Russian influence during The Great War reshaped both countries. After the war, Romania fell squarely into the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence and later into the Warsaw Pact. After World War II, a slow process of forming an identity focused on speaking the Romani language and diminishing the Hungarian culture/language.
From 1945 to the early 1950s, land reforms in Transylvania reduced economic opportunities to Hungarian ethnics. The first event that shaped the Romani-Hungarian experience was the first Citizenship Act (1947) which determined that those who could prove their lineage were true citizens. This act forced up to 200,000 people to emigrate. The above events also strengthened ties with Hungarian nationals.
Gains such as political representation begin in 1946, followed by the establishment of Csángós-Hungarian language schools. The schools were later discontinued in the 1950s. In 1949, the Hungarian Roman Catholic Bishop Alba Iulia and Aron Marton were put in prison. Marton was later put under house arrest until 1967. Meanwhile, going into the 1950s, leaders of the Hungarian People’s Union were imprisoned and charged with treason. By 1953, the Union was disbanded.
The second event that shaped the Hungarian ethnic experience was the Hungarian Revolution (1956), which caused resentment toward the Soviet Union and sympathy among Romani-Hungarians. This was quelled by mass arrests, imprisonment, and deportation supported by Warsaw troops. By 1960, the Csángós Hungarian Autonomous Region was redrawn and renamed the Mures-Maghiar Autonomous Region. Romani-Hungarians were subsequently discriminated against in forming farming collectives.
The third event was the election of Nicolae Ceausescu as the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party (August 21, 1965). This period also marked a rise in suppressing the Romani-Hungarian population with the installation of puppet representation in government (Council of Workers of Hungarian Nationality). Despite the measures against them, political gains were made in the creation of schools, Hungarian-language newspapers, a political party (Hungarian Socialist Workers Party), and ties with Hungarian nationals.
Yet regardless of any gains, due to the strength of the USSR, backing any reformative change was limited and any protests or potential uprisings were quelled. By 1974, minority publications were limited due to a paper shortage. Later that year, a Romanian cultural heritage law was enacted, making all archival materials “property of the people,” which also allowed all documents written by minority groups to be confiscated and destroyed. Concurrently, Romani culture, especially in Transylvania, was highlighted.
By the end of the 1980s, the Soviet Union was dissolving and the anger and frustrations of both the Romani and Hungarian minorities could not be denied. What began at the Reformed Hungarian Church in Timișoara grew from frustration, to anger, to a mob spreading throughout the country, later turning the military against the government, and finally ending with the death of the Ceausescu family.
The Rumor Mill
The months following the end of the Ceausescu regime were a point of contention within Romania. This was due to the different perspectives held by Romani and Hungarian ethnics. What was a fact or a rumor often got muddled during this time. Presented here are the main events up to and on March 19, 1990, which is often referred to as Black March.
By 1990, the press was becoming nationalistic by feeding on an already present sentiment of mistrust and worry due to the sudden rise of various minority groups.
As the national day for Hungarians, March 15, came closer, the Romanian press began to state that the date was a planned annexation of the Transylvania state to Hungary. As Hungarian travelers crossed the Tisa River, the impression was of the amassing of an army.
During this time, the rumor mill was ramped up. Some rumors were true while others were alleged. The Romanian press stated that pharmacist Doamna Kormoczi in the town of Târgu Mureș was erasing prescriptions in Romani. The Hungarian press stated that the Romanians had done this. The rise of far-right group Vatra Românească occurred during this period and members voiced their anger when a statue of Nicolae Bălcescu (Romani soldier/historian) was toppled by Hungarians yelling “Death to Romanians!” and “Transylvania to Hungary!”
Signs at the entrance of a town were changed to Hungarian and the town became Marosvasarhely (Hungarian) rather than Târgu Mureș (Romanian).
On March 19, 1990 the home of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) was attacked by a mob of Romanians. As the mob grew, the ethnic Hungarian staff fended for themselves by retreating inside to escape the mob or tend to injuries. Calls for police protection were unanswered.
By the next day, a bigger mob of 15,000 Hungarians gathered in the town square. Another group of 3,000 Romanians went to meet them. As word started to spread, buses with even more Romanians arrived. By 2:30 p.m., the chief of police spoke to both parties, stating that roadblocks had been set up to halt the influx of people. They would later learn that was a lie as more Romani armed with axes and spears came to back their countrymen.
By 5:00 p.m., violence ensued as the police were overwhelmed. Several street fights started between the two groups at locations throughout the town. Romani Gypsies were also attacked, forcing them to join the fighting.
As the fighting subsided, tensions remained high, leading to uneasiness. Sporadic riots and ethnic clashes occurred as a stable government was created. Years later, the press was pointed out as a contributor to the tensions.
Regarding police actions, a Human Rights Watch Report was released shortly after the events stated, “The authorities . . . failed to respond in an adequate manner to protect the citizens of Târgu Mureș. In this sense, the riots can be seen as a symptom of the fact that police, and the law enforcement agencies in general were very weak and morally compromised at the time because of how the communist regime had fallen.”
Jumping Forward
In March 2022, a statue was placed in Târgu Mureș Center as a memorial to those who died during the clashes. Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó of Hungary stated in the Daily News Hungary stated, “The lesson of Black March was that people and nations must help, not oppose, each other in the struggle for prosperity.”
Does this mean that hostile relations between the two groups are in the past? I cannot say for certain, but my impression is that the opportunities after the Romanian Revolution of 1989, did not work in creating a national image to include all ethnic groups.
According to recent commentary on the Council for European Studies (CES) article, “Confronting Nationalism: Romania and the Autonomy of the Romanian–Hungarians (2020),” the loyalty of Romanian citizens of Hungarian ethnicity to the Romanian state is often questioned.
The most recent diplomatic scandal between Romania and Hungary started with the lower house of the Romanian Parliament accepting a project of autonomy based on ethnic criteria. Without prospects for the future, Hungarians in Romania are caught in internal political battles, which is why autonomy seems to be the solution to get out of anonymity. With that said, did the press stir the pot in March 1990 or did it bring to boil something that was already simmering?
Economic Zones: Thai Nationals and Burmese Laborers (1980s – )
Visitors to Thailand are often drawn to three main tourist hubs: Bangkok’s notorious nightlife zones, Chiang Mai’s nomad enclave that share space with wats (temples) and elephant sanctuaries, and the beaches and raunchy nightlife of Pattaya.
This is the side of the country that, according to Rajiv Biswas’s 2023 article , (Thailand’s economy faces headwinds from manufacturing sector downturn, Sept 2023) “drives economic recovery, bringing in 12% of GDP ($500 billion) with an expected growth into the 2030s to $860 billion.”
The other area of growth is the manufacturing sector, which is competitive due to the abundance of raw materials, innovative technologies, and, most importantly, low cost-labor. Here, I’m going to focus on that labor, mainly the racial aspects of Burmese employment that create a negative image of migrants who are stuck between Thailand and Myanmar (Burma).
My focus is on Burmese nationals because they make up the largest portion of migrant labor and are suffering from ongoing military dictatorships (1962–2011 and 2021-Present).
Remaking an Economy
By the 1980s, the forward momentum of Thailand’s modern economy experienced a recession. Unfortunately, with this downturn came a restructuring and focus on export-driven manufacturing at a time when major international brands were looking at exporting labor to save on their own labor costs.
By the 1990s, this switch resulted in 80% of Thailand’s total exports (garments, footwear, textiles, and electronics). Manufacturing areas such as Mae Sot, Samut Prakhan, and especially Three Pagodas Pass began to grow because they were close to neighboring Myanmar and Laos.
Working Conditions
On average, Burmese workers start early and finish late, often taking on 10+ hour days with two scheduled breaks. Protections are fairly limited and are at the discretion of bosses/management who use a variety of tactics to keep workers in perpetual servitude.
Paying into services given mainly to Thai Nationals, Burmese laborers rarely, if ever, reap those rewards. More often than not, they are kept in limbo due to the ongoing military campaigns in Myanmar and the perception of taking jobs away from Thai Nationals.
“All the shops selling consumer goods, CDs, and (illegal) clinics for Burmese made me feel like I was walking in Naypyidaw (in Burma). If you walk to this community alone, you would be watched with hostile eyes as if you were a stranger invading their community. There are voices behind you with language you don’t understand. How could this happen? This is Thailand, isn’t it? . . . My young friend who was working at the hospital there told me that many Burmese women were brought to the hospital with strange symptoms. The doctor’s diagnosis reported finding sharp, long bamboo sticks inside their wombs, which he assumed was caused by illicit abortion .” (Ruth et al. Thailand’ Hidden Workforce, 2012)
Burmese workers often resent being in between their usefulness to the Thai economy and how they are treated. Some Burmese learn Thai and adapt to their clothing and culture to show their assimilation into society. Others enroll their children in Thai schools so they can learn Thai and English as well Burmese. Stuck in this in-between place was much more difficult due to the 2020–2022 COVID Pandemic lockdown where Burmese found themselves blamed for increases in infections .
Due to low pay, Thai nationals avoid the labor-intensive jobs and complain that the Burmese have taken all the good jobs away.
“As you know, Thais don’t want to do the jobs that Burmese are doing nowadays. Who will do these jobs if the Burmese are not in Thailand? We also want to go back and stay in our own country where we don’t have to be afraid of the police and people like the Palm Gang who attack Burmese people on the road at night . . . Nobody wants to stay in someone else’s country but we have no choice . . . Some Thai people don’t have a good impression of the Burmese. One day when I went to a Thai house to do some construction work, the owner did not allow any of the Burmese workers to enter his house . . . the owner thought all Burmese are thieves .” (Ruth et al. Thailand’ Hidden Workforce, 2012)
Unfortunately for many families to support themselves, they accept the treatment and often the physical harm that come with their roles, yet progress has been made. In 2014, the Thai government made it illegal to exploit migrant workers and have provided health insurance to workers.
Regardless of the government’s efforts, a stigma still exists that the Burmese are opportunistic criminals.
Conclusion
Does racism exist between ethnic groups worldwide? Yes, it does. Does it happen in isolation? No, it does not. In South Africa, racial tensions developed due to the lack of a migration policy. In Romania, a change in government compounded with media failure caused civil unrest. Finally, in Thailand, a mix of COVID, war, and economic zones that took advantage of low-wage workers resulted in resentment and mistrust.
These three countries illustrate what happens when weak or nonexistent policies, failing political and public systems, and helpless scapegoats are focused on instead of focusing directly on the resolution of at least some of the many racist issues. The status quo has got to go but is the idea of a post racist society a pipe dream? If you ask me, the answer is yes. There will always be differences between different groups and classes. As long as they exist opportunities to use those differences as rallying points can be exploited. The answer to this question is not simple. Regardless, I have to believe that the first step is to simply not blame another group for whichever issues have presented themselves but rather start by asking “how did we get here?”
2021 Alexandra Township Riots
1996 Report by Alternative Press on Ethnic Tensions in Romania (transcript below video)
Myanmar Coup Crosses The Border - June 2022
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j3-98RpAsFE