Keeping The Status Quo (Bosnia-Herzgovina)

Stoking The Fires of Nationalism

May 25, 2025

Survivors of the Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica learn of the fall of the United Nations safe haven, Tuzla, Bosnia, 1995.
(Credit: Ron Haviv / VII)

Help me reach 1,000 subscribers by December 31st, 2025. Please share Emancipatory Research with anyone who enjoys reading, learning and conversing about history and geopolitics.

At this time, the world is dealing with up to thirteen wars, ranging from terrorist insurgencies to civil wars. Yet now when we see images of violence, we do not immediately think of Europe. For many people, the thought of an active war within the borders of East or Western Europe, is comparable to the period prior to World Wars I and II when European nations fought constantly among themselves.

That period is now reverberating throughout the Russo–Ukrainian War (2022– ). This war, like all wars, is socially viewed as barbaric and certainly not a conflict that countries with majorities who classify as “white” or “ethnic white” would engage in unless they are viewed as the rescuer, the savior, or the diplomat.

Here, we look at Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is a country of strained relations forced by diplomacy to co-exist. Officially the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, the country resides on the Balkan Peninsula bordering Croatia (north and west), Serbia (east), and Montenegro (southeast). The country’s most recent war being the Balkan War (1992–1995), is the topic of my interview with Director Amina Krvavac of the War Childhood Museum in the capital of Sarajevo.

Image from War Childhood Museum’s first permanent exhibition (Photo Credit: War Childhood Museum)

Interview War Childhood Museum

My initial questions were about their plans to extend the museum to a secondary location in Kiev. However, those plans have been put on hold due to the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war. I felt the ongoing internal politics and interpretation of the modern history of Bosnia and Herzegovina were much more engaging topics and so I adjusted my questions to reflect my feelings.

Thibert: I know that, as per museum policy, you must stay apolitical. How does this extend to the narrative of the museum? How do you approach the topic of war with children without talking about (Slobodan) Milošević or the former Yugoslavia?

Dir. Krvavac: First of all, I wouldn’t say that we are apolitical. There is no way that anything can be avoided about what happened here in the 1990s. We will be open for everybody because three different ethnic groups have parallel narratives: Bosnians (which consists of Bosnian Muslims or Bosniaks), Croats, and Serbs. We are navigating this by focusing on personal stories. We don’t provide any broader context.

Note: Yet it was this broader context that mattered the most, specifically in understanding how the region continues to be in limbo that could lead to either the dissolution of the State or to the second Bosnian War.

Bosnian soldiers smoke and take a break on the frontline next to a sign that says, “Welcome to Sarajevo” in Sarajevo, Bosnia, in the fall of 1994. Trench warfare took place all around the city. (Photo Credit Ron Haviv / VII)

The War Criminal in the Next Town

The recent appearance of Nationalist President Milorad Dodik (Republika Srpska) (2010 –2018, 2022– ) in Russia only made waves within Western Europe. This detail is similar to how unexpectedly the Bosnian War of the mid - 1990s became a featured headline in international news after the UN stood by as Bosnian Muslims were slaughtered in the Srebrenica Massacre.

As of February 2025, Dodik was barred from politics for six years and given a prison term of one year for pushing through legislation and bypassing due process. Both charges were only the beginning as prosecutors are waiting to add additional charges against him. His disappearance and subsequent reappearance, which was prompted by an arrest warrant, serve as reminders of the relationship that the Soviet Union had with Dodik during the war.

“Dodik’s influence has loomed large as the most prominent Bosnian Serb politician in a country that continues to be deeply divided along ethnic lines, more than 30 years since one of the bloodiest conflicts in Europe since World War II,” Una Hajdari, a freelance journalist covering the Balkans. Her article, “Bosnian Serb leader appears in Moscow as authorities step up pursuit,” appeared in POLITCO on April 1, 2025.

My visit to Bosnia’s Tunnel of Hope in 2018, prefaced how blissfully ignorant people were shortly before the widespread usage of the internet. My guide, as well as other Bosnians (Bosnian Nationals), would sometimes share their personal stories of the Siege of Sarajevo (April 1992–February 1996) and of loss and growing up without a parent, sibling, or extended family member. All I could think of was how normal my teenage years had been.

My guide stopped his vehicle en route to Sarajevo to talk about how the war criminal who killed his uncle was living and enjoying life in Republika Srpska (the enclave community of Bosnian Serbs). He pointed in the enclave’s direction while expressing his frustration and anger. My only way of relating to that period was in a personal reflection in one of the stories shared at the then newly opened War Childhood Museum.

However, personal recollections did not help with my current understanding of the internal politics. At best, my interpretation came down to simple concepts drawn from the various groups involved: The Russians were keeping the region out of NATO. Srpska was attempting to gain autonomy or join Serbia. Bosnia and Herzegovina was moving towards the European Union and NATO. The remaining minority groups would also like autonomy within their own nation states.

I would later be corrected that politics were also about making sure that the region never really moved forward. Because if it did, the nation would unravel. In its current state, it remains on the precipice of exploding into conflict.

“They had to give up part of the country’s name. It would no longer be the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, just Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serbs gained political control of a large proportion of the territory from which they had expelled the non - Serb population. This was achieved by dividing the country into two entities, each with its own Parliament and its own security forces. The Bosnians and Croats would share 51% of the territory as one entity called the Federation. The Serbs would get the other 49% of the territory as an entity whose name included the crucial republican prefix that Bosnia and Herzegovina itself had lost: Republika Srpska,” Lynne Jones in her book “Then They Started Shooting: Growing up in wartime Bosnia” ( p. 131).

The Dayton Accords (1995) officially ended the Bosnian War and forced various groups into becoming quasi-neighbors. An attempt was made to give everyone a gain but also a loss that they could accept. In the end, there would be separate elections, leaders, and communities. Dayton was a promise that life could return to normal, that the ethnic cleansing had ended, that people could go home and start the healing process. That war was over.

In hindsight, the accords created more opportunities for corruption, nationalism, and divisions.

Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) meets with Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik (left) in Belgrade, Serbia, on Jan. 17, 2019 (Photo Credit MIKHAIL KLIMENTYEV/AFP via Getty Images)

Good Old Days

There are three specific areas to examine before delving into the current politics of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first area is the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the rise of nationalism. The second area is the Dayton Accords and the influence of foreign actors (United Nations, United States, and Russia). The third area is the perspectives and interpretations of the histories of the various ethnic groups and how nationalism allows politicians to use both this area and Dayton to advance their own agendas.

To get a thorough understanding of the first area, I reached out to Elma Hasimbegovic, historian and curator for the National Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina to discuss the events leading up to the war and touch on some of the current nationalism.

Our conversation has been edited to focus more on the main topic.

Hasimbegovic: In 1945 when World War II ended, they (Yugoslavia) started building the State’s narrative on the war. The same thing happened in the 1990s but from a completely different perspective. In 1940s, the war unified nations in collectively fighting against fascism. In the 1990s, people lived in a society that was inherited from the Yugoslavia period. Many sought to destroy this society by divide it along ethno-national lines. After over 50 years of living together in one state, now the main political idea was to destroy the multi- ethnic society of Bosnia Herzegovina.

Thibert: Was the Bosnian War about different ethnic groups vying for supremacy or about the land?

Hasimbegovic: About the land?!? It sounds more like it was really about tribes that were very barbaric. I would say everything is about legacy. It’s also about, of course, the economy and privatization. Economic reasons were important, but one of the first things to do is destroy this idea of a multi-ethnic state and multi-ethnic society. The process was to divide, learn hatred, and start fighting, which happened successfully 30 years later.

Even the land, if you want to put it that way, has been separated. It has already been marked into different categories. We are living in a divided society with a tenuous peace nowadays.

Thibert: In 2024, Bosnian Serb lawmakers adopted a report denying that the killing of 8,000 Muslims in Srebrenica during the Bosnian War constituted genocide. Later, thousands of Serbs protested against a UN resolution to commemorate the atrocity. What was your reaction to this proclamation? How does the museum counter such accusations?

Hasimbegovic: I was also writing a strategy for the Srebrenica memorial, and I am more involved in creative politics. My personal opinion is that we don’t react to daily politics because all of these statements are referring to and related to daily politics and Bosnia Herzegovina. The past is very much abused and manipulated. Some years ago, the same assembly of politicians from Republika Srpska recognized the genocide in Srebrenica and there were several arrests. There was a time when these same politicians who are nowadays denying the genocide were accepting it, apologizing, and openly stating the numbers and the genocide as a fact.

When the time came for the politicians to share different narratives, then they decided to work more on denial and bomb the public on daily bases with such statements. Denial. Denial. Denial constantly. Denial is something that people in Srebrenica, for example, who live there now are constantly facing or coping with.

When we deal with such sensitive issues as genocide, then we must use facts to fight the denials. We use Hague-based facts when constructing the stories or the exhibitions’ formats that have been established and confirmed in the Hague tribunal.

Thibert: Let’s go back a bit to Joseph Broz Tito. The fall of Yugoslavia is often attributed to his passing in 1980. During his life, he was able to keep the various ethnic groups in line. Can you clarify what exactly happened to cause the dissolution of the nation? Was it because no one could prevent one group from superseding the others?

Hasimbegovic: That’s a pretty big question. Tito was a figure, a personality. The cult of Tito was already established in early stages of Yugoslavia and he was viewed very much as a unifying personality that the whole nation loved and adored. The cult was intentionally developed throughout Yugoslav times and then dwindled after he died.

I’m coming from the museum’s view that is very much about Tito and Yugoslavia partisans and about their path to becoming a uniting factor. Tito was a part of this establishment and was a war hero as the commander of the Yugoslavian Army. Tito was developing a socialist Yugoslavia, but he said no to Stalin and no to Russian or Soviet Union supremacy and domination.

Tito was also dealing with Western democracies, even as he cooperated with them. Yugoslavia was a really different multi-ethnic country. Yugoslavia as a nation didn’t exist, but people felt like they were Yugoslavs in general, but they also identified themselves as Croats, Serbs, Bosnians, and Muslims, so we are not talking about Yugoslavia as a nation. So, there was a strong state with Tito as it’s leader. He kept Yugoslavia strong by making people feel that they are special because they are at the center of East and West.

After Tito’s death, these feelings could not last much longer. First of all, World War II was fading away and the survivors and all the people who fought against fascism were passing away. Time made a difference. Tito was not alive any longer and the nationalists were always somewhere nearby. Obviously, Yugoslavia was not able to find its own way after Tito’s death. I mean we cannot talk about a successor who could keep the same narrative, particularly after communism fell. because there wasn’t one.

Everything collided. In the Eastern Bloc, the Berlin Wall fell and communism fell with it. Yugoslavia as a country was not able to transform into a modern democracy and obviously didn’t manage to separate or breakup like Czechoslovakia or similar countries. That made its fracturing smoother.

Arkan’s Tigers kill Bosnian Muslim civilians during the first battle for Bosnia in Bijeljina, Bosnia, March 31, 1992. (Photo Credit Ron Haviv / VII)

“There was nothing about the Serbian Communist leader’s visit to Kosovo Polje on April 24, 1987, to suggest it would change the course of history. But for the first time, Slobodan Milošević donned the mantle of protector of all Serbs. It was a stroke of good fortune for the young Party Chief. The Serbian President, (Ivan) Stambolić, should have gone himself for talks with local leaders, but casually sent Milošević in his place. It was a careless move which set in motion a train of events that would cost him his career,” according to Laura Silber and Allan Little in Yugoslavia: Death of A Nation, p. 37.

Thibert: During Slobodan Milosevic’s speech in Kosovo, he pointed his finger into the distance and stated, “They’ll never do this to you again. Never again will anyone defeat you.” Why was this moment so inspiration to Serbs?

Hasimbegovic: History marks that moment. Of course, change didn’t happen from that moment onward. That was not the momentum that changed history. Kosovo is a very particular place in Serbian history. From then until today, we are talking about Kosovo in a different way. The Serbs called Kosovo the “Heart of Serbia” or the “Heart of the Serbian State.” Kosovo is at the core of Serbian nationalistic rhetoric.

Kosovo is historically important because of its war against the Ottoman Turks in 1389 that resulted in the Serbian kingdom being demolished. This defeat reset the Serbians’ rebuilding themselves as a country. The Ottoman Turks occupied Serbia for more than four centuries. So that’s why Kosovo is important. Its importance was used very often by Milošević and Serb nationalists. Milošević was born and raised as a socialist and then as a communist politician. He mentioned the Serbs’ nationalistic sentiments in a speech given in the heart of Serbia—Kosovo. This sparked the fires of the subsequent wars. Of course, this was just one event that later on was proclaimed as the source of the Serbs’ momentum, but it’s really just one in a series of events that included the fall of Yugoslavia and the beginning of the war in 1991.

Thibert: During my time in Sarajevo, I encountered a number of people who were upset that war criminals were allowed to avoid justice and live freely in Republica Srpska. Can you clarify why the judicial process is taking so long? For example, Milosevic (2001–2006) received a criminal trial, as did Radovan Karadžić (2016).

Hasimbegovic: If you look at it from a historical perspective, it’s like Nazi Germany and the Hague tribunal. You would say it is a successful process. Numerous trials happened after the war, but I don’t know how many, as I have forgotten the number. I do know that Radovan Karadžić, the political leader of the Bosnian Serbs, was arrested and sentenced. Ratko Mladić, the military commander of Bosnian Serbs, was arrested and sentenced to life. If you look at it from only the legal perspective, the highest ranked officers were tried and sentenced.

Of course, we are talking about many hundreds of people who were, one way or another, involved in the war. Many of them probably committed war crimes, but we do not know the facts. Some local courts are doing a better job of trying cases. From a historical perspective, Bosnia -Herzegovina has the most war criminals who have been tried and convicted.

What we are talking about is the communities of regular people who are complaining about seeing war criminals in their local communities. People are seeing them walking freely on the streets. After the war, many of them accepted some political or other positions, and people still cannot cope with this situation and were unhappy when seeing these criminals at a local level. People can, however, talk about injustice and the not yet prosecuted war criminals.

As humans, we are used to seeing things around us, and what is worse, in this case, is not the number of trials and sentenced war criminals. Instead, the problem is that we are seeing war criminals as war criminals, but we are not putting them on that side of history. One side still celebrates seeing them as heroes, and the bigger the war criminal is, the more celebrated that person is. For example, when Karadžić was sentenced, he became a bigger hero among a certain group in the population.

Thibert: Milorad Dodik, who was recently seen in Russia, said, “There is no peaceful coexistence where one side is always expected to apologize. We tried that. It failed.” Can you clarify his intention with this statement? Is this a sentiment shared with groups outside of Srpska?

Hasimbegovic: This same Dodik is now an outlaw sought by Interpol. The moment that he crossed the borders set by the Constitution while trying to defend himself by sacrificing the country, he became the person who was apologizing, talking peace, and shaking hands for reconciliation. Then he returned to power.

Thibert: So, his position changed recently?

Hasimbegovic: Yes, his position changed, but it’s still in line with the political developments over 30 years ago when he was supposed to come into power and offset the legacies of Karadžić and Mladić and all of the others who created Republika Srpska. He was against them and was the one openly promoting reconciliation, coexistence, and apologies, and then the rhetoric changed. The political situation changed. To stay in power now, he uses terrible hatred speech.

Milosevic's 1989 Gazimestan Speech (partial) 600th Anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje

Foreign Intervention (West)

By June 1991, the former Yugoslavia moved towards war as Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their independence. An apt description of ethnic tensions can be found in the book Yugoslavia: Death of A Nation by Laura Silber and Allan Little. “Belgrade Television was firmly in Milošević’s grip. It was the ideal tool for stirring up hatred against “the enemies of the Serbian people” starting with Kosovo’s Albanians, then the Slovenes, the Croats, and finally, the opposition in Serbia itself.” Milošević commanded the Yugoslav People’s (or National) Army (JNA) with support from Serbia to assist in suppressing succession movements without success.

Instead of focusing on what was happening on the ground, let us turn to each major foreign group’s intervention in the conflict and what prompted their involvement. Please keep in mind that the events leading up to and throughout the conflicts involve many actors and smaller events. What I hope to do is give a clear overview to help you in getting your bearings and to draw parallels to how current events could follow a similar path. The initial intervention was the United Nations (UN) and the European Community.

“The United Nations became actively involved in the situation in Yugoslavia on 25 September 1991 when the Security Council, meeting at the ministerial level, unanimously adopted its Resolution 713 (1991) expressing deep concern at the fighting in that country and calling on all States to implement immediately a ‘general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia,’” (Department of Public Information, United Nations, September 1996).

In the UN’s Resolution 713, the cause for an intervention is listed as the high loss of human life, material damage, and damage to the neighboring nations. What the European Community feared was a destabilization of the region that could lead to a refugee crisis and higher military and civilian costs.

By April 1992, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was positioned in Croatia to deescalate the situation. Their intervention was initially meant to be temporary, but it turned into “more than ten years, thousands of peacekeepers, and hundreds of millions of dollars later,” according to the Wilson Center’s Global Europe Program, as the center of the ongoing conflict transitioned to Bosnia.

By 1995, UNPROFOR’s involvement was seen more as inconsequential due to the Srebrenica Massacre. Deemed a “safe area” under the protection of the United Nations, it turned into a killing zone that was made worse by the UN peacekeeping forces standing by and unable to assist as Bosnian Serbs “carry out systematic, mass executions of hundreds, possibly thousands of civilian men and boys and to terrorize, rape, beat, executive, rob and otherwise abuse civilians being deported from the area.” According to an investigation by Human Rights Watch, this “safe area” became a zone where people fled to safety only to slowly realize they were walking into a slaughter.

Throughout these events, the United States took more of an observational approach.

Bosnian and Croatian prisoners of war at the prison camp in Trnopolje, Bosnia, 1992. (Photo Credit Ron Haviv / VII)

“The war could have been short-circuited more quickly had the United States acted more decisively. But one of the reasons why it didn’t and still doesn’t in Kosovo that neither the Clinton administration nor the intellectual community has articulated well a crystalline and naked national interest that the millions of ordinary Americans can immediately grasp,” according to Robert D. Kaplan’s 1993 book Balkan Ghosts (p. xxi).

The prevailing theory as to why the United States did not enter the war at its onset is because it was—and still is—a European issue. There was no threat to the U.S.’s foreign policy. Nothing was to be gained after the end of the Cold War. The U.S. on the world stage was already engaged in other affairs, including the breakup of the USSR, the North Korean threat, Haitian migrant crisis, fall of the Berlin Wall, the Persian Gulf War, and an impending crisis in Somalia. All of these events had estimates of the true cost of military and financial interference in an ethnic civil war in a region that most Americans could not find on a map.

After the footage of concentration camps drew comparisons to the Nazi camps and became featured news in 1992, public opinion about the region started to emerge. It was not enough to sway the administration of President George H. W. Bush (1989–1993).

As former Secretary of State Colin Powell stated, “Civilians have stuck us into problems before that we have lived to regret. I have some memories of us being put into situations like that which did not turn out quite the way that the people who put us in thought, e.g., Lebanon.”

President William “Bill” J. Clinton (1993–2001) during his campaign spoke about an increased U.S. presence in Bosnia, but once in office he took the same stance as President Bush. All of this transpired during a period when there was a concern that, if the United States appeared weak militarily, it could lead to a shift in geopolitical relations. Instead, they straddled the fence by not taking a side, but they did attempt to coerce a balancing of military might between fractions. Slowly this position changed due to the Siege of Sarajevo (April 1992–February 1996).

It was not until 1995 that the United States officially entered this ethnic civil war. At this point, the Bosnian Serbs had declared the end of the war on their terms and the possibility of it spilling over into Kosovo and Macedonia was mounting. The other dynamic was how the execution of Muslims would be viewed throughout the Middle East. The Clinton Administration grew tired of the carnage and, most importantly, the U.S. had to assert its dominance over global events and support its role in NATO. The continued war without direct intervention undermined all U.S., efforts..

President Clinton prerecorded televison address from the White House on Friday (1/12/96), ahead of his lightning visit to the 6,000 US troops deployed in the Former Yugoslavia

Foreign Intervention (East)

Russian involvement in the Dayton negotiations was relatively small compared to NATO and the U.S. During the war, Russian troops were deployed along with NATO troops under President Boris Niolayevich Yeltson (1991–1999).

In this section, I refer to how the Russians’ involvement via the Bosnian Serbs transitioned to how this relationship is currently viewed while taking into consideration the concerns of the West. I refer to the journals of Nikola Koljevic who was a leading politician of the Bosnian Serbs and assisted in the creation of Republika Srpska.

“The Muslims are probably expecting more concrete aid from America, especially after the statement made by Turkish President Ozal, who is ‘seeking’ to have ‘armed action against the Serbian aggressors’ undertaken. Secretary of State Warren Christopher spoke the most about the fact that America will help ‘quell’ the war in Bosnia. Then he spoke about the fact that the Russians will be actively involved. This is really the biggest news: two representatives—an American and a Russian—will take part in the negotiations,” according to Nikola Koljevic in Belgrade on February 11, 1993.

Following the negotiations from 1993 to the creation of the Republika Srpska region under the Dayton Accords in 1995, the tone takes on a slowly frustrated attitude on multiple counts. Here, we see a commentary on the war that doesn’t cast the Bosnian Serbs as the moral victor, but instead views them as a group attempting to create their own identity and homeland from what remained of Yugoslavia. This is punctuated by frustration on how the West views the Muslims and Croats as victims, “The Russians would like us to ‘just’ announce that we are accepting the Vance–Owen Plan ‘in principle,’ and as far as the maps are concerned, they would like us to say that they will be corrected ‘over the course of negotiations.’”

Frustration later sets in as a realization that negotiations will never favor Bosnian Serbs. Thoughts on whether it will be suitable to start a new conference led by the Russians without the British or U.S. also mediating for them is considered but not acted on. By late 1993, Koljevic’s opinion of the Russians changes as they are seen as no better than the Americans.

In a letter dated February 1994, Yeltsin pleads to all Serbs—Bosnian Serbs, Serbs, and all leaders to pull back and end the war so they can all work towards peace. Russian mediation is seen by the Western press as shrewd and cunning. The creation of Republika Srpska became viewed as a way for the Bosnian Serbs to survive.

Bosnian Serb protesters holding posters depicting former Bosnian Serb army chief Ratko Mladic, during a protest in Mladic’s hometown of Kalinovik, Bosnia-Herzegovina, May 29, 2011. (Photo Credit: AP/Amel Emric)

“Serbian political and military leaders were people intoxicated by patriotism and freedom, and they were prepared to make any sacrifice in order to create and defend the Republika Srpska. These were people who were capable of battlefield exploits and who were devoted to the freedom and survival of the Bosnian people in Bosnia Herzegovina. . . . They made mistakes big and small; they were maximalists in their objectives. But war itself is the greatest of human errors,” Nikola Koljevi in July 1995.

Koljevic continues that leaders from each side— Alija Izetbegović (President of Bosnia Herzegovina), Franjo Tuđman (President of Croatia), and Radovan Karadžić (President of the Republika Srpska)—should not be compared to most people due to the actions each took during the war. Unlike the others, Karadžić is the one to be humiliated and subject to charges as a war criminal.

So, how does this relationship shape today’s current relations between the enclave and nation? Under the current Russo–Ukraine war, there has been an increase in Western concern that the war could establish a secondary front within the Balkans. A 2022 article by Maida Ruge of the European Council on Foreign Relations titled “How Russia’s Revisionism threatens Bosnia” highlighted that Russia’ interest overlaps with the “local players” and enforces that the main goal “in Bosnia over more than two decades has been to keep the state divided and dysfunction, and to prevent it from developing its own foreign policy, including joining NATO.”

How credible are these concerns? Let’s take a look at Russian influence within the region. Russian gas supplier Gazprom, through TurkStream, and oil supplier Gazpromneft currently provide services throughout the region. Russia has also blocked the recognition of Kosovo as an independent nation. Ties also run through both religion and support of the Serbian identity, which many Serbs feel is threatened. Militarily, Serbs purchase arms and receives training from Russia. As Serb nationalism increases, so do these ties.

But the big question is would Russia use military might to support of the Bosnian Serbs? I looked to author Tim Marshall for an answer. In a 2021 interview on the topic, he said, “1999 (Kosovo War 1998–1999) was for me the high-water mark of European and American absolute dominance of Europe and it was the moment where the Russians said ‘Okay, that’s enough’ and they stood by and watched as parts of Bosnia were bombed mostly by the Americans and how the Americans basically came in and stopped the Bosnian War as they weren’t prepared to put up with it any longer. Not everyone knows, but it is strongly thought that it was Putin who was a Senior Advisor to Yeltsin at the time who whispered into Yeltsin’s ear ‘We cannot have this.’ So right at the very end of the Kosovo War as NATO was on the border of Macedonia waiting to advance into Kosovo, the Russians got into their armored cars. [They] drove out of Bosnia all the way down and entered Kosovo and took up positions at the airfield. At that moment, they announced themselves as back on the world stage.”

Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Wednesday (2/23/94) said he was inviting leaders of the United States, France, Germany and Britain to a one-day summit to resolve the war in former Yugoslavia.

Borders within Borders

Thus far we have looked at the histories of each foreign group, touching on how these relationships developed. Yet the biggest piece of the puzzle is how this all plays into the current internal politics of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a reminder, the ethnic makeup of the country, which includes Republika Srpska as an enclave, is made up of Bosnians/Bosniaks (which include Bosnian Muslims) who are 2/5ths of the population; Serbs (Bosnian Serbs) who are 1/3rd ; and Croats who make up less than 1/5 th of the population. The remaining groups fall into either Jewish or Balkan from other regions. The war changed the social and living patterns irrevocably.

Prior to the Balkan War, communities were mixed ethnically. After the Dayton Accords, individuals and families were allowed to return home and a small minority where able to accomplish this. Some groups found returning as impossible now finding that their ethnic group was now a minority in what was previously an area in which they where the majority. Some families found new families living in their homes and wearing their clothing, and they were unable to vacate them from the property. This new culture is exemplified in the following quote from Lynne Jones in Then They Started Shooting: Growing Up in Wartime Bosnia.

“Instead of something for everyone, Dayton had become nothing for most people. Far from reversing ethnic cleansing and creating an integral, functioning democratic state, Dayton had given legitimacy to leaders who still trumpeted the benefits of an ethnic separatist project built on paranoia, murder, and forced expulsion. The lines of ethnic partition were frozen solid. Indicted war criminals retained their prestige and influence, and corruption was rampant.”

“Biljana Plavsic described Republika Srpska, of which she was then president, as ‘a state in which the budget does not actually exist, where police are involved in smuggling and stealing from their own state, and where a majority of the population Iives in abject poverty.

“These contradictions were particularly apparent in the Drina Valley. Gorazde was the only enclave in eastern Bosnia to hold out against the Bosnia Serb assault. Dayton had designated the municipality as Federation territory except for one suburb of the town, which had previously had a Muslim majority but went to Republika Srpska.”

Fast forward to today and Bosnia and Herzegovina is listed as one of top three corrupt countries within Europe. Currently in a downward trend that has been steady since 2016 with a slight rise in 2018 before falling even lower in 2024. This is punctuated by the recent Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) uncovering an illegal travel document scheme that has been active since 2013, and involves Balkan gangsters having access to Balkan government databases to create fake IDs and identities to be used throughout Europe.

How does this play into the various governments of the region? As stated above, each group has vied for changes that upsets the “balance” of the Dayton Accords while using the situation for personal gains. This has led to nationalism playing a big part in politics. An example of this is the 2022 attempt of the Croatian National Parliament (HNS) of the Bosnian Croat population pushing for electoral changes or else they will request autonomy. An example of corruption is the recent exposure of a former Bosnia police officer turned Bosnian security minster (2023–2025), Nenad Nesic who is currently in jail under corruption charges.

What does this say about the future of the country? To the surrounding nations? Would Serbia or Croatia attempt to absorb the fragmented enclaves into themselves? Where does this leave NATO and the European Union whose main focus is further East and have already made a considerable investment into Ukraine?

Status Quo

Baščaršija is one of the most popular sites within Old Sarajevo. As a slice of the Ottoman Empire, this is where the Bosnian Muslims ethnic group traces its heritage. Full of bazaars, pubs, hotels, mosques, and restaurants that provide a feeling of security within the mix of cultures. Yet within this tapestry, there have been increased reports of discrimination towards Muslims. What may sound like a minor issue highlights that when nationalism is used as a propaganda tool in its void grows Alt Right groups (Blood & Honour, Combat 18) who transfer those messages into acts such as painting swastikas on walls and violence.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is still widely overlooked. For those who follow the geopolitics of the region, the idea of sending peace keepers in the region is not far-fetched as U.S. had a joint NATO base there until 2004. Yet it is one that could escalate an already tense situation. Yet as I come to my own conclusions, I reflect on a question that I asked Historian Elma Hasimbegovic of the National Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Thibert: NATO was asked by the United Nations to intervene in the Bosnian War, which leads us to the Dayton Accords and a peace settlement in August 1995. By 1998, the Kosovo War had begun. During this interim period, many believed that another war was around the corner or was there a belief that it was time to rebuild? Were there still tensions?

Hasimbegovic: Honestly, when Bosnian War was over in 1995, nobody talked about the war in Kosovo. But it was the end of the war for Bosnia and Herzegovina and what was going on in Kosovo was not part of the agenda any longer. Bosnia was living in peace, going through its reconstruction phase, or building. Refugees were going back home or not. So, Kosovo was not issue at that moment in fact until 1999 NATO intervened and bombed Serbia. That was celebrated, marked, or noticed, but in general people were ignorant here about the situation. If you asked an ordinary citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina about what happen in Kosovo, they know the Serbs made a mess there and did crimes, but nobody could really name what happened or say anything historical.

If I had to guess how this could unravel, it would be due to Kosovo moving closer to achieving autonomy and recognition. NATO has a presence in the region (Kosovo Force KFOR) leading the peacekeeping efforts. This is a vital part of Eastern European campaigns. The ethnic Serbs within Kosovo have clashed with NATO peacekeepers most recently as the summer of 2024 over a border dispute and in a violent 2023 incident that the Kosovo government has stated Serbia is responsible for supporting.

The ethnic communities within Bosnia and Herzegovina profit more by keeping the status quo, while Kosovo moves closer to the red line. An event which could deliver the entirety of Europe into another war.

Blood and Honour blog published a photograph whose caption said it showed “Republika Srpska activists revealing an ‘Islam Out of Europe’ banner.” 2015 (Photo Credit: Unknown)

Emancipatory Research